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REFLECTIONS ON THE BELGRADE MEETING (1977-78)
OF THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION
IN EUROPE*
Jose A. Cabranes**
The thirty-five states that signed the Final Act
of the Conference on Sesurity and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE) in Helsinki in August 19751 came together on
October 4, 1977 in Belgrade for the first CSCE follow-
up meeting, designed to conduct a full review of the
1975 undertakings. The Belgrade meeting ended on
March 9, 1978, after more than five months of incon-
clusive sparring among its various blocs or caucuses.
The concluding document of the Belgrade meeting
was not earth-shaking or inspirational. It was little
more than a short factual statement or communique.
It recorded the fact that the meeting had taken place
as a follow-up to the Helsinki Conference of 1975.
It stated that there had been "a thorough exchange of
views both on the implementation of the provisions of
the [Helsinki] Final Act and of the tasks defined by
the Conference." 2 It reaffirmed the "resolve" of the
* Remarks delivered at the Council on Foreign Relations,
New York City, April 18, 1978.
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1. See DEP'T STATE BULL. 323 (1975); 14 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 1292 (1975).
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participating states to "implement fully, unilaterally,
bilaterally and multilaterally, all the provisions of
the Final Act." 3 Finally, it stated the intention of
the participating states to hold "further meetings"
under the aegis of the CSCE, the second of which iS to
be held in Madrid commencing November 11, 198o.4
The Belgrade concluding document did not even
mention the one aspect of the Helsinki Final Act that
the United States had emphasized most -- human rights.
This unexciting finale to the Belgrade meeting --
in such sharp contrast to the "media event" of 1975 at
Helsinki -- and the simple ennui of its long delibera-
tions, have prompted some commentators to write the
meeting off as a worthless enterprise. The absence of
something quite tangible to show for five months of
effort accounts for the uninspired public response to
the Belgrade meeting; one columnist in the New York
Times has even accused the Administration of suffering
a "humiliation in Belgrade on human rights." 5
The malaise about the outcome of the Belgrade
meeting is shared by some members of the United States
delegation, despite the predictable public statements
by the Department of State proclaiming the success of
its efforts at the meeting and a unanimous joint
resolution of Congress congratulating the delegation
on its work. Even the delegation's chairman, Arthur
Goldberg, has privately expressed some discouragement
with the CSCE process.
I believe this disappointment is largely unwar-
ranted. It is based in some measure upon unreasonable
expectations of what could be accomplished at such a
meeting, and some impatience with results other than
the spectacular, In fact, from the perspective of a
regional public order, the Belgrade meeting was a
success; a moderate success, but a success nonethe-
less.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 1266.
5. Safire, ChapZain to the World, N.Y. Times, Mar, 23,
1978, at A21, col, 3.
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There is reason to be thankful for a number of
positive results. Most important of all is the
survival and reinforcement of the CSCE process it-
self. Having met for five months, and agreed to
disagree about the course of implementation of the
Helsinki Final Act, the participating states settled
upon the next biennial CSCE meeting. This is an
achievement in itself -- a small step in the direc-
tion of establishing a permanent multilateral arena
for periodic review sessions on the implementation
of the broad principles embodied in the Helsinki
Final Act.
There is some irony in the fact that by 1978 it
is the United States, rather than the Soviet Union,
which puts so much stock in achieving a degree of
institutionalization and continuity for post-Helsinki
activities.
The 1975 Helsinki accord, which reportedly
brought tears to the eyes of Leonid Brezhnev,
culminated a twenty-year Soviet diplomatic effort to
achieve an authoritative international agreement
confirming post-war frontiers. A careful reading of
the Helsinki Final Act -- a document widely invoked
but rarely read -- will confirm that the Soviet Union
did not achieve its principal objectives. The Soviet
bloc did not obtain a surrogate World War II peace
treaty. It did not obtain renunciation of territorial
claims or a commitment to the immutability of present
frontiers. The Helsinki accord did not endorse the
Brezhnev Doctrine on intervention in "fraternal
countries" in derogation of "an abstractly understood
sovereignty."6 The United States, Britain and France
did not waive any Four-Power rights in Germany,, In
exchange for a solemn reaffirmation of principles 6h
the sovereign equality of states, the inviolability
of frontiers and non-intervention in internal affairs,
the Soviet bloc accepted principles concerning
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and
a range of undertakings on human contacts, the flow of
6. The Brezhnev Doctrine, asserting a broad right of
Soviet intervention in Eastern Europe, was articulated in an
important article in Pravda following the 1968 invasion of
Czechoslovakia. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1968, at 3, col. 1.
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information, and cultural and educational interaction.7
Nevertheless, in 1975 it was the fond hope of the
Soviet Union and the fear of State Department
specialists -- amply fulfilled in time by the Western
press -- that the Helsinki accord would be widely
regarded as an effective post-war political settlement.
Understandably, at the outset it was the Soviet Union,
rather than the United States, which evinced the
greatest interest in the institutionalization of the
Helsinki process through such devices as a permanent
secretariat and sustained follow-up conferences.
It is probably true that the Soviets achieved in
the press what they had unsuccessfully sought at
Helsinki. The rage of American citizens of Baltic
extraction -- the outcry that they had been "sold out"
by President Ford and Secretary Kissinger -- was a
testament to the Soviets' successful public opinion
campaign.
That victory was short-lived. The sense that the
Soviets had achieved their objectives on frontiers,
and that this was further evidence that detente was
a "one-way street," helped to stimulate interest in
securing Soviet bloc implementation of the human
rights provisions of the Helsinki Final Act -- an
interest greatly reinforced by dissidents and some
members of national minorities in Eastern Europe who
promptly embraced these provisions.
Between 1975 and 1977 the follow-up implementa-
tion conference scheduled for October 1977 and the
CSCE process itself became a major object of interest
to a wide assortment of persons and non-governmental
organizations in this country and throughout Europe.
In the United States, the interest in assuring that
human rights should remain a central feature of
East-West relations, and that detente not become a
"one-way street," was shared by an unusually broad
range of constituencies: associations representing
Eastern European immigrants and their progeny
(including the so-called "captive nations" groups),
7, See, e.g., Russell, The Helsinki Declaration:
Brobdingnag or Lilliput?, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 242 (1976);
Schachter, The Twilight Existence of Nonbinding International
Agreements, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 296 (1977).
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academics and writers concerned about the loss of
purpose in American foreign policy, organizations
devoted to the problems of Soviet Jewry, liberal
organizations concerned with international human
rights issues, bar association study groups, and
traditional conservative cold warriors, to name a
few.
The extraordinary outpouring of interest in
the human rights provisions of the Helsinki accord,
in the public and in Congress, was received with
considerable suspicion and reserve in Dr. Kissinger's
State Department. An administration devoted to the
notion of "linkage" -- the inherent interconnection
of all major issues in Soviet-American relations --
seemed to fear the possible destabilizing effects
of treating the Helsinki Final Act as a charter for
a campaign for human rights in the Soviet bloc.
CSCE matters were given little bureaucratic
prominence in 1975 and 1976 in the Kissinger State
Department; the CSCE staff remained under the wing
of the NATO office in the Bureau of European Affairs.
The State Department's evident lack of interest
in the "Helsinki process," and the concern of these
disparate constituencies that the Department not be
the sole overseer of implementation of the Helsinki
Final Act, prompted the establishment by Congress in
1976 of the Commission on Security and Cooperation
in Europe. The legislation establishing the
Commission, originally sponsored by Rep.
Millicent Fenwick and Senator Clifford Case, both of
New Jersey, provided for membership including six
Senators, six Representatives and one member each
from the Departments of State, Defense and Commerce.
Under its chairman, Rep. Dante Fascell of Florida,
the Commission quickly won a reputation as an
aggressive champion of the rights of dissidents in
Eastern Europe and the interests of the American
ethnic constituencies connected to sectors of Soviet
bloc societies. Its publicity-prone activities
inevitably won the enmity of Soviet bloc states and,
it is fair to say, the studied indifference, if not
hostility, of the State Department. The Commission
and its staff, headed by Spencer Oliver (a former
official of the Democratic National Committee), were
regarded as determined to take partisan political
advantage of the Department's cautious approach to
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the Helsinki process; until the very end of the
Kissinger regime, noncooperation was the clearly-
established Departmental policy toward the
Commission.
The new administration made two distinctive
changes in American foreign policy, each of which
was promptly reflected in CSCE matters: the eleva-
tion of human rights concerns to the front ranks of
policymaking, and the commitment to "open government."
These two principles of the new American foreign
policy generated widespread public support in the
United States and abroad for the Carter Administration.
They also caused, as Karl Birnbaum of the Swedish
Institute of International Affairs wrote in mid-1977,
"considerable bewi.lderment b th in official circles
and in the media" in Europe. For a time, they also
caused considerable bewilderment to the career
Foreign Service officers who had handled CSCE matters
since the days of Henry Kissinger.
The newly-found American enthusiasm for a Belgrade
meeting largely designed to put the East on the
defensive on human rights questions must have dampened
whatever interest the Soviets retained in the follow-
up process of CSCE. This new American approach to
CSCE was highlighted not only by the President's
avowed interest in human rights, but also by the
implementation of his commitment to open government.
In CSCE matters this commitment to open govern-
ment was first demonstrated in plans by the State
Department for periodic briefing sessions in
Washington for American non-governmental organizations
with a special concern for human rights and life in
Eastern Europe; human rights groups and organizations
composed of Americans of East European origin were
constituencies whose special interests were identified
and recognized in Department planning by early 1977.
In the spring of 1977 the administration invited
the members of the Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe to join the United States
8. Birnbaum, Human Rights and East-West Relations, 55
FOREIGN AFF. 783, 793 (July 1977).
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delegation to the Belgrade meeting. In addition,
the Commission's staff was added to the delegation --
a group which almost equaled in number the Foreign
Service officers assigned to CSCE matters. The
introduction of these new delegates, whose function
in earlier times had been to second-guess State
Department professionals and to claim a significant
public role in CSCE matters, was clearly a sign of
the changing American policy; it was also, inevitably,
a source of irritation and distress to Foreign
Service officers fearful of a "takeover" by single-
minded "amateurs" who did not have an appreciation
of the full range of U.S.-Soviet relations.
The next stage in the implementation of the open
government policy in CSCE matters was the decision,
taken in mid-August, apparently without consultation
with officials of the Bureau of European Affairs,
to expand the United States delegation to the
Belgrade meeting by including some public members.
The two original invitees -- Professor Andrzej
Korbonski of UCLA, a Polish-American specialist in
East European politics, and I -- were proposed by
Mr. Brzezinski and Secretary Vance, respectively.
When Professor Korbonski and I were contacted in
August 1977 and invited to join the delegation, the
chairman of the delegation was scheduled to be
Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher. We
were informed that Secretary Christopher planned to
be in Belgrade for the opening days of the meeting;
for most of the rest of the three months that the
meeting was expected to last the delegation would be
headed by Ambassador Albert W. Sherer, a career
diplomat who had served as ambassador to Czechoslo-
vakia and had helped to negotiate much of what
became the Helsinki Final Act. As far as I knew,
the delegation was to consist of the usual array of
State Department specialists, along with some
representatives of other interested departments.
It all seemed quite conventional. After all, the
inclusion of public members on United States delega-
tions to international conferences was hardly
unusual, especially in the post-Versailles era.
It was understood that Professor Korbonski's
total time commitment, and mine, could be limited to
about two weeks in Belgrade, although he was prepared
to take a leave of absence for the fall semester in
order to participate in a meeting of vital importance
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to the area to which he has devoted a professional
lifetime. I was informed from the outset that the
total number of public members was still under
active consideration.
In early September it was announced that Arthur
Goldberg had been asked by the President to be the
Chairman of the delegation, apparently on the
recommendation of Secretary Christopher. By mid-
September, when Professor Korbonski and I traveled
to Washington for a luncheon meeting with Mr.
Goldberg, we found that the size and character of
the delegation was different from what we had
imagined, and different from what the State
Department's CSCE staff had originally hoped for.
Some of the Foreign Service officers with whom
Professor Korbonski and I met in mid-September
seemed to be in a state of shock. They had not yet
devised a policy of peaceful coexistence with the
Commission and its staff, and now, lo and behold,
they would have to deal with political commissars
from the public as well!
That day's tidings had brought the news that,
in addition to Korbonski and I, several
other public members would be added, including Sol
C. Chaikin, the president of the International
Ladies' Garment Workers Union; John Borbridge, a
leader of the Native American Community of Alaska;
and Professor Joyce Hughes, a black woman who is
a distinguished law teacher at Northwestern
University Law School and a vice chairman of the
National Urban League.
Korbonski, Cabranes, Chaikin, Borbridge and
Hughes,, each was a plausible member of a delega-
tion of this sort. But taken together, in the
midst of the shock and alienation produced by
disclosure of the new and expanded delegation list,
they proved somewhat overwhelming; they were
dubbed -- promptly and inevitably -- "the ethnics ,,
The fears and anxieties of the Foreign Service
officers in the Bureau of European Affairs were
clear enough: they were worried about political
and professional displacement, about the dis-
organizing effects of an overwhelming number of
"amateurs," and finally, about the possible
transformation of the Belgrade meeting into a
destructive confrontation with the Soviet bloc.
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It was, all in all, exceedingly untidy, and we are
told that nothing is more unsettling to ranking
Soviet officials than perceived decentralization or
disorganization in American policymaking.
These concerns were doubtless reinforced by the
proclaimed intention of Arthur Goldberg to serve as
a full-time chairman of the delegation. Unlike
Secretary Christopher, who had planned to attend only
the first sessions of the meeting and leave the
delegation in the hands of Ambassador Sherer,
Goldberg planned to stay for the whole meeting. In
mid-September 1977, State Department officers clearly,
felt that the United States delegation had simply
been taken over by the proverbial "outsiders."
In retrospect, it seems to me that they ought not
to have been totally surprised by the changes made
in the spring and summer of 1977. After all, these
changes were merely an expression of the oft-repeated
commitment of the Department's new leadership to
principles of open government, a commitment which
reflects, I believe, the deeply-felt convictions of
that leadership, especially Secretary Vance and
Deputy Secretary Christopher.9 It is also an under-
standable and possibly inevitable consequence of
the secretiveness with which previous Administrations
conducted foreign policy, and of congressional and
public demands, in the aftermath of the debacle in
Southeast Asia and Watergate, for closer public
scrutiny of the actions of the executive branch.
Recasting the United States delegation to the
Belgrade meeting had offensive and defensive
significance. In one fell swoop, the Department had:
*included would-be surrogates of our principal
disaffected communities and of the domestic
constituencies most eager to have the United
States vigorously review the Soviet bloc's
implementation of the human rights provisions
of the Helsinki Final Act;
9. See, e.g., Secretary Vance's policy statement of
April 18, 1977, on conferences abroad, in which he required
that delegations "reflect the composition of American
society." DEP'T STATE NEWSLETTER, May 1977, p. 10.
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*embraced, and sought effectively to co-opt,
its most severe Congressional critics; and
*conveyed to the Soviet bloc and to others
an unmistakable signal that the United
States was fully prepared to make human
rights the principal subject of discussion
at Belgrade.
Arthur Goldberg's appointment as chairman
symbolized the change of personnel and the change in
the direction of United States policy. It undoubted-
ly reinforced the anxieties of those, at home and
abroad, who feared that an aggressive and sustained
American attack on the Soviet Union's human rights
record would do serious harm to the process of
detente. For Goldberg would clearly be the pre-
eminent chief delegate at the Belgrade meeting; no
one of comparable stature had been appointed by any
other participating state. Goldberg's appointment
would be read as a raising of the political stakes
of the Belgrade meeting. He had a long and well-
established record of concern for human rights and
the plight of dissidents in Eastern Europe. He was
a leader of the American Jewish community, which
obviously is assumed to be at the forefront of
public interest in the problems of Soviet Jewry.
And, as a major political figure concerned with the
preservation of a public reputation in these matters,
he would be certain to pursue a policy of public
confrontation -- a policy of "standing up to the
Soviets."
Goldberg made it plain from the outset that he
would certainly raise individual human rights cases
in Eastern countries. Moreover, we all knew -- and
all meeting participants knew -- that Goldberg was
very much on his own. He had no formal instructions
at the beginning of the Belgrade meeting; he did
not receive any, by his own account, until the very
last. days, when it became necessary to take formal
action on particular versions of the final document.
By the time this large and diverse delegation
reached Belgrade in early October, the CSCE meeting
had become, to the American press and public alike,
"the Belgrade human rights conference." By March 2,
when James Reston interviewed President Tito, he
asked the Yugoslav leader -- of all people -- whether
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he was disappointed with the "Belgrade human rights
conference" for which the aging dictator was host.10
Expectations in the United States, and in parts
of the United States delegation, were high. It was
clearly the hope of many observers and some members
of the delegation that the review of implementation
of the human rights provisions of the Helsinki accord
would be sufficiently disturbing to the Soviet Union
and its allies to cause them to modify some of their
practices, especially with respect to the treatment
of human rights advocates and dissidents in the East.
Everyone in the delegation recognized that the
rule of consensus, which gives every participating
state a veto on decisions of the meeting, necessarily
limited the direct action that the meeting could take.
However, proponents of a pugnacious approach expected,
at the very least, a final document that made
significant references to the question of human
rights and to the differing viewpoints expressed at
the meeting concerning human rights implementation
efforts.
On the other hand, other members of the delega-
tion, especially career Foreign Service officers long
associated with CSCE matters, were fearful that the
Goldberg policy of discussing individual cases in
particular countries could have a seriously disruptive
effect upon the West's relations with the Soviet bloc.
The possibility that the Soviet bloc would simply
walk out of the Belgrade meeting was not discounted.
These concerns about the new American approach,
which would include public denunciations of Soviet bloc
actions in individual cases, were quite clearly shared
by some of our allies and by the neutral/non-aligned
bloc of states, some of which also have a vital stake
in the security provisions of the Helsinki Final Act.
The tension between a concern for human rights and an
interest in the preservation of the Helsinki process
persisted throughout the meeting, particularly among
our allies, who share our values but remain skeptical
about the management of our human rights policy.
10, N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1978, at A6, col. 5.
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Allies and neutrals alike were, and remain,
concerned that the American interest in political
advantage on human rights (largely for home
consumption) tends to place the United States far out
in front of our allies; when the Europeans, for
tactical or other reasons, took the lead on human
rights questions in Belgrade, American delegates were
not above claiming credit for having stimulated their
interest in the subject, In short, there was (and
there remains) a concern among our allies and among
neutral states that the United States might convert
the CSCE process into a propaganda campaign that the
Soviets would feel compelled to terminate.
It was Arthur Goldberg's responsibility to keep
the United States delegation on an even keel and
aggressively pursue our stated human rights objectives
while maintaining overall unity among the Western
allies and avoiding the collapse of a process with
which the Soviets showed increasing impatience.
He succeeded -- far beyond my own initial
expectations. There was a successful review of
implementation of all aspects of the Final Act, in-
cluding human rights. The principal objective of the
Eastern states at Belgrade was to limit the political
damage through a short and generalized meeting in
which the parties would concentrate on security
issues and the review of human rights implementation
would be limited to the expression of views by each
state concerning its own record. The East wanted a
"positive" atmosphere at Belgrade. They did not get
it. The review of implementation was prolonged --
lasting through October, November and part of
December; it often involved review of individual cases.
One of our public members, Professor Korbonski,
believes that the United States adopted an unduly "low
profile," in order not to antagonize the Soviets and
jeopardize the Helsinki process and in order to "keep
the allies happy."ll I disagree. The appearance of a
"low profile" was in some measure due to the poor
press coverage of the meeting -- a natural consequence
11. A. Korbonski, "I Went Looking for the Enemy and
(Almost) Didn't Find One": Reflections on my second visit to the
Belgrade Conference, November 3-15, 1977 (Dec. 18, 1977) (informal
report) (quoted by permission of the author).
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of the fact that only the first and last weeks of the
meeting were open to the press. The desultory press
coverage of the meeting was a source of anxiety to
Arthur Goldberg and his colleagues.
We know that the Eastern states do not believe
ours was a low profile on human rights; I was
informed that at one point the Soviets formally
protested Goldberg's behavior in Belgrade. The
neutrals and nonaligned, as well as some of our
allies, believe that we were too loud and aggressive
on the issue and too single-minded about the review
of implementation. President Tito, for example,
worried aloud about this single-mindedness; he told
James Reston that "[t]he Helsinki decisions cannot be
reduced to this only," and stated an intention to
raise the matter with President Carter during his
trip to the United States. 1 2
Indeed, it was probably our high profile on
human rights which made impossible a final document
that dealt with the subject. The United States went
to Belgrade to discuss human rights and little else,
and it did just that. Unlike at Helsinki, the East
was not being offered anything particularly valuable
in exchange for renewed assurances on human rights.
We should not have expected, as President Tito
observed, that the SovietUnion would "put its signa-
ture, at such a gathering, to something that it
would not be able to carry out" 1 3-- unless, of
course, we were prepared to offer something quite
substantial in return.
In addition to accomplishing our major objective,
a full review of implementation, the Belgrade meeting
succeeded in establishing that:
*human rights conditions within a country
are a matter of legitimate international
concern and an integral part of the CSCE
implementation review process and, there-
fore, a part of detente itself;
12. N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1978, at A6, col. 6 (city ed.).
13. Id.
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*in future reviews of implementation, the
United States will be concerned with
individual cases, as well as broad state-
ments on human rights and fundamental
freedoms; and,
*the CSCE, an element of detente,
is a long--term process, which provides
an arena for continuing public scrutiny
of the internal order of participating
states.
We should not underestimate the very real and
substantial domestic benefits derived from the
continuation of the CSCE process. The mere existence
of the CSCE forces each participating state
to react defensively to the projected implementation
review, with resulting changes in domestic
legislation and, in some cases, a raising of the
threshold pf tolerance for dissent. In the United
States the recent adoption of a major change in our
laws governing non-immigrant visas (the so-called
McGovern Amendment)14 is directly attributable to
our preparations for the Belgrade meeting. Our laws
now require that an alien excludible from the United
States by reason of membership in a proscribed
organization, but otherwise admissible to the United
States, be admitted unless the Secretary of State
determines that his admission would be contrary to
national security interests. The projected
establishment of the President's Commission on
Foreign Language and International Studies is also
a direct result of our country's preparations for the
Belgrade meeting. 1 5 So too is the bill introduced
in early March 1978 by Reps. Fascell and
Fraser to establish an Institute for Human Rights
and Freedom to promote respect for observance of
human rights in foreign countries.1
6
The CSCE process can stimulate unusual legis-
lative alliances on matters relating to U.S.
-Soviet relations between conservatives and liberals
14. P.L. No. 95-105, § 112, 9-1 Stat. 848 (1978) (to be
codified in 22 US.S. 9 2691).
15. Exec. Order No. 12,054, 43 Fed. Reg. 17,457 (1978).
16. RR. 11326, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
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in this country -,,, all because of a common interest in
the pursuit of human rights in Eastern Europe. It
also makes possible unusual and fruitful collaboration
on questions of detente between members of the legis-
lative and executive branches of government.
The Belgrade meeting was the beginning of a
process that we should hope will continue indefinitely.
It was a learning experience for all the participating
states, not least of all the United States. There are
several lessons we ought to have learned. First of
all, we ought to be careful in the future to avoid
misunderstanding or misstating the criteria for
success of any such meeting. The measure of success
is not necessarily how many individual cases are
resolved to our satisfaction during a meeting or as a
result of a meeting. Success must be measured by the
degree to which implementation of all parts of the
Helsinki Final Act remains on the East-West agenda.
We should recognize, as Karl Birnbaum has noted, that
"a crucial --though not a sufficient -- condition for
improvements in respect to human rights in the East
is the continuation of detente itself. To safeguard
the continuity of d6tente must therefore be the first
priority of any Western policy designed to champion
human rights in the Warsaw Pact countries." 1 7
A second lesson to be learned from the Belgrade
meeting is that the West should not expect at such a
meeting much more than a review of implementation and
a terse concluding document unless the West is prepared
to make it worthwhile for the East to do more than
grin and bear it. We should make sure that at the
Madrid meeting (1980) there will be "something in it"
for the East. That "something" may be from an area
other than CSCE, but it should be perceptible. Just a
little bit of "linkage" helps the medicine go
down ....
Third, for the Madrid meeting the West should
plan for a prolonged period for the review of imple- -
mentation of the Final Act; however, it should not
plan any extensive negotiation of the concluding
document at the meeting itself. The two months spent
at the Belgrade meeting -- in January, February and
early March -- in haggling over a final document was
17. Birnbaum, supra note 8, at 796-7.
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a complete waste of time as Arthur Goldberg will
readily testify. It also contributed to the
erroneous impression that the meeting was a failure.
We should take advantage of the next two years to
consult with Eastern states, as well as with our
allies and with nonaligned states, to develop the
substance of a concluding document well before the
beginning of the Madrid meeting. This will give
Eastern, Western and nonaligned states a clear sense
of the possible bases for agreement well in advance
of the Madrid meeting; it will also avoid the
suggestion that the Madrid meeting is a success or
failure solely because of the final document.
This would not be the first international conference,
nor the last, to adopt a document which had
effectively been negotiated in a series of bilateral
and multilateral consultations before the conference.
Fourth, the United States should devote more
attention to the unglamorous question of the rules of
procedure. Its delegation should be more concerned
with questions of process. The first order of
business should be to institutionalize this multi-
lateral arena and to do so in a way that will permit
the press and the general public to have greater
access to subsequent CSCE meetings. These important
procedural objectives can be achieved only in a
atmosphere relatively free of recrimination.
Fifth, the United States, and especially the
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe,
should devote considerable attention to further
implementation of the Helsinki Final Act by the
United States; We should go to Madrid with our
hands as clean as possible. The Commission is
ideally placed to stimulate a creative alliance of
conservative and liberal legislators concerned with
human rights issues at home as well as abroad.
In this connection, the Commission should review the
ninety-odd proposals submitted at the Belgrade
meeting and determine the extent to which any of
them may plausibly be implemented unilaterally or
bilaterally. Arthur Goldberg has spoken of the need
for our own private Helsinki monitoring group,
modeled on those organized in Europe.
Sixth, the United States might indicate its
seriousness of purpose by limiting the use of the
Madrid meeting as an opportunity for visiting
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American political figures to speak out on particular
pet projects or themes designed to gain favor at
home. Although affording visiting members of Congress
an opportunity to address the meeting is a valuable
tool in forging executive-legislative bonds, it
suggests to other participating states that the
United States is using the meeting as part of a
propaganda war against the East designed, in part, to
curry favor with domestic constituencies hostile to
Eastern states.
Finally, the cooperative working arrangement
created at Belgrade by two previously hostile groups
of specialists -- the Commission staff and the Foreign
Service officers assigned to CSCE -- must be con-
tinued. There was no more impressive achievement at
Belgrade, from a domestic political perspective,
than the working alliance devised by these formerly
antagonistic groups. Under the arrangement for an
enlarged delegation the executive branch effectively
co-opted its most significant congressional critics;
the price paid for this co-optation was the cession
to the Commission staff of a significant, though not
preponderant, role in shaping the policies of the
U.S. delegation. This mutually beneficial arrangement
made it possible for the United States to go to Belgrade
united. It was a highly successful and innovative
approach to the principle of open government and should
be replicated in Madrid.
Whether Congress should seek to participate in
other multilateral conferences in a comparable way
is a question that inevitably will arise from this
positive experience. It is true that the Commission
and its staff received virtually all cables and
documents seen by the State Department officials, and
there was not a single breach of confidentiality.
This may not be a useful or desirable formula for
collaboration in other areas, such as SALT. However,
the model is likely to be suggested in the future. It
deserves some serious consideration.
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